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I. INTRODUCTION
In October 2008, Congress passed the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA) that created the Troubled Asset Relief
Program (TARP) and appropriated $700 billion to "restore liquidity and
stability to the financial system... ."' Pursuant to TARP, the U.S.
Government's extraordinary investment in private business was undertaken
to combat the financial crisis. 2  The amount of federal assistance to
financial institutions and the automotive industry was staggering. As of
March 31, 2010, the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury) had
planned TARP expenditures of approximately $497 billion, of which
approximately $382 billion had been disbursed. Financial institutions
accounted for the largest amount of funds, primarily in the form of direct
investment of capital through financial institution support programs ($320.7
billion) as well as another $51 billion categorized as asset support
programs, the purpose of which was to support the liquidity and market
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University of Cincinnati College of Law. Thanks to the editors of the
Entrepreneurial Business Law Journal for inviting me to participate in the March
2010 Symposium, The Relationship Between American Government and American
Business. John Wolfenden, University of Cincinnati College of Law, expected
2012, and Aaron Bernay, Rosina Caponi and Jerrod Kuhn (all University of
Cincinnati College of Law, expected 2010) provided excellent research assistance.
This article reflects events as of July 1, 2010.
'Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 § 2(1), 12 U.S.C.A. § 5201 (West
2008).
2 While government bailouts are not new, earlier forms of assistance generally took
the form of loans, guaranties, insurance or other subsidies. See Cheryl D. Block,
Overt and Covert Bailouts: Developing a Public Bailout Policy, 67 IND. L.J. 951,
1031-34 (1992) (describing past government bailouts). In the savings and loan
crisis of the 1980s, the FDIC took preferred shares or warrants in a number of
failed banks; the U.S. government received warrants in Chrysler Corp. in the
automaker's previous bailout. Id.
3 OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF
PROGRAM, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS, 33 (Apr. 2010) [hereinafter
SIGTARP, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS Apr. 2010].
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value of assets owned by financial institutions.4 Support to the automotive
industry accounted for $84.8 billion.5
Through the TARP program, the government became a substantial
equity holder in five major U.S. companies. Two of them-American
International Group, Inc. (AIG), an international insurance organization,
and. Citigroup Inc. (Citigroup), a global diversified financial services
holding company'-are publicly traded corporations; three are currently
privately owned-General Motors Company (GM), one of the world's
largest automakers that traces its roots back to 1908,8 Chrysler Group LLC
(Chrysler), for years America's third largest automaker,9 and GMAC Inc.
(GMAC), now known as Ally Financial Inc. (Ally), which was founded in
1919 to provide financing to purchasers of automobiles.'o
By mid-2010, the government's investment in business is winding
down." Many of the banks and financial services firms that were recipients
of TARP funds have returned to profitability and have repaid their loans
ahead of schedule.12 Treasury began divestiture of its Citigroup shares
through sales in the market. 13 In June 2010, Treasury announced a TARP
"milestone": repayments ($194 billion) exceeded the amount of TARP
funds outstanding ($190 billion).14 It also announced that Treasury had
received approximately $23 billion in interest, dividends and other income
and that the overall projected cost of the TARP program was estimated at
4Id. at35 fig.2.2.
5 id.6 AM. INT'L GRP., INC., 2009 ANNUAL REPORT (2010), available at
http://www.aigcorporate.com/investors/2010_April/2009AnnualReport.pdf.
7 CITIGROUP, CITI ANNUAL REPORT 2009, at 4 (2010), available at
http://www.citigroup.com/citi/fin/data/ar09cen.pdf
8 About GM, GENERAL MOTORS, http://www.gm.com/corporate/about/ (last visited
July 21, 2010).
9 Chrysler LLC, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/
business/companies/chryslerllc/index.html (last updated Aug. 10, 2010).
1o Our History, ALLY FINANCIAL, http://www.ally.com/about/company-
structure/history/index.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2010).
" In December 2009, the Treasury Secretary exercised his power under EESA and
extended TARP through October 3, 2010. TARP's focus shifted to home
foreclosures and small-business and community lending initiatives. SIGTARP,
QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS Apr. 2010, supra note 3, at 33.
2 Id. at 5.
13 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Treasury Announces the Completion
of its Current Trading Plan to Sell Citigroup Common Stock (July 1, 2010),
available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/tg764.htm.
14 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Treasury Dep't Announces TARP
Milestone: Repayments to Taxpayers Surpass TARP Funds Outstanding (June 11,
2010), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/tg742.htm.
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$105.4 billion, an amount less than the original forecast." Although it is
unlikely that the government will be able to extricate itself from AIG in the
near future,'6 and the government has put forth no solutions" for the
intractable problems of the government-sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac that were placed in conservatorships in September 2008,8
the era of federal bailouts appears to be drawing to an end-for now.
Indeed, government, the American taxpayer, and business alike all
fervently wish for an end to government bailouts, for the alliance of
government and business has been an uneasy one. Treasury consistently
described itself as a "reluctant shareholder" 9 to express its discomfort with
the role, and Main Street resented the money and the attention paid to Wall
Street while home foreclosures and unemployment rates went up.20 TARP
recipients complained about having to account to a variety of federal
bureaucrats with competing and conflicting demands; 2' businesses that did
not receive federal assistance complained of disadvantages from competing
with government-assisted businesses.2 2
The bailouts present many troubling issues that will be analyzed and
debated for years to come. To date, congressional committees and panels
have held over one hundred hearingS23 on the federal bailout, Congress has
set up the Congressional Oversight Panel to oversee the TARP program24
16 In its Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ending Dec. 31, 2009, AIG states
that should certain risks occur it may require additional federal assistance, without
which there is substantial doubt about its continued existence as a going concern.
Am. Int'l Grp., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 17 (Feb. 26, 2010).
1 Sewell Chan, Under Pressure, the White House Ponders How to Remake Fannie
and Freddie, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2010, at B3.
18 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Statement by Secretary Henry M.
Paulson, Jr. on Treasury and Federal Housing Finance Agency Action to Protect
Financial Markets and Taxpayers (Sept. 7, 2008), available at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hpI129.htm.
'9 See, e.g., OFFICE OF FIN. STABILITY, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, AGENCY
FINANCIAL REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 42 [hereinafter OFS FINANCIAL REPORT
2009].
20 This was reflected, for example, in the public's anger toward bonuses paid to
AIG executives. Brady Dennis & David Cho, Rage at AIG Swells As Bonuses Go
Out, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 2009, at Al.
21 See, eg., Monica Langley & David Enrich, Citigroup Chafes Under U.S.
Overseers, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 2009, at Al.
22 See, e.g., Colin Barr, Former GMAC Bank Under Attack, CNNMoNEY, June 3,
2009, http://money.cnn.com/2009/06/03/news/ally.enemy.fortune/index.htm.
23 I am grateful to Shannon Kemen, University of Cincinnati Law Library, for
compiling a list from government sources. Information on file with author.
24 About Us, CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, http://cop.senate.gov/about/ (last
visited Oct. 10, 2010).
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and the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission to examine the causes of the
financial crisis, 25 and both the U.S. Government Accountability Office
(GAO) 26 and the TARP Special Inspector General (SIGTARP) 27 are
responsible for monitoring the administration of TARP and issuing reports
periodically to Congress. The lessons we learn can have important
implications for future government action. Notwithstanding the assertions
that federal bailouts and "too big to fail" are over,28 the passage of the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the Dodd-
Frank Act)29 contains little that will prevent firms from being "too big to
fail" in the future. Businesses will continue to take risks to maximize
profits, and it is likely that they will operate with an assumption that, in the
face of systemic risk, the government will again bail them out.
Despite the likelihood of future bailouts, the government has not
articulated a consistent policy to deal with private enterprise failure, and
there is no rule book for how the government should act as a shareholder.
This is not surprising; the philosophy of free market capitalism, so deeply
engrained in the U.S. economic system, is difficult to reconcile with the
government's rescue of businesses that fail in that system. 30 Unlike some
other countries, the U.S. government does not invest surplus funds or
engage in entrepreneurial activities for economic gain.3' The phrase
"nationalizing private business" conveys serious negative connotations.
Accordingly, how the government behaves when it is a significant
shareholder in private business is a question worthy of examination. Part II
of this Article sets forth, as background, general principles of corporate
25 FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, www.fcic.gov (last visited Sept. 21,
2010).
26 See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, www.gao.gov (last visited Sept. 21,
2010).
27 See SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM,
www.sigtarp.gov (last visited Sept. 21, 2010).28 See SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, Hous., AND URBAN AFFAIRS, I11TH CONG.,
BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT (2010).
29 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank),
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (July 2010) (to be codified in scattered
sections and titles of U.S.C.).
30 Block, supra note 2, at 990-93 (asserting a free-market presumption against
public bailouts); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Joint Statement by the
Treasury, FDIC, OCC, OTS and the Federal Reserve, (Feb. 23, 2009), available at
http://www.treas.gov/press/ releases/tg38.htm (stating that "our economy functions
better when financial institutions are well managed in the private sector").
3 Others have explored the conflicting philosophies of government and business.
See, e.g., Benjamin A. Templin, State Entrepreneurism (Thomas Jefferson Sch. of
Law, Research Paper No. 1428108, 2009), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id= 1428108.
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governance as well as the TARP bailout policy as articulated by Congress
and the executive branch. Part III then closely examines the government's
actions as an equity holder. It begins with the closest parallel to the current
situation, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's (FDIC) 1984
acquisition of an eighty percent ownership interest in the public holding
company of Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Co. (Continental
Illinois), which was, before its failure, one of the ten largest banks in the
United States. 32 The paper then looks at the 2008-09 bailouts of AIG,
Citigroup, GM, Chrysler and Ally and shows that the government has
developed a policy for how it acts as a shareholder. Moreover,
notwithstanding the government's assertions of a "reluctant shareholder"
policy, the government has been deeply involved in these companies as a
creditor, regulator, and legislator.
Finally, in Part IV, I argue that government intervention in business has
become sufficiently regular that the government should develop policies for
the future so that its actions are more forthright and transparent. To that
end, I set forth a modest proposal consisting of three suggestions. First,
when Treasury is a substantial shareholder, it should work with corporate
management to provide regularly the general public with clear specific
statements about government intervention and its effect on the corporation.
The public is entitled to more information because this is not "business as
usual." The second and third proposals contemplate that the government
will exercise the customary power of a substantial shareholder and select
directors that will represent the taxpayers' interests in the boardroom.
Specifically, as the second proposal, when Treasury is a substantial
shareholder in a public corporation, it should use its power to nominate and
run its own nominees for the board of directors, who would serve on the
board as representatives of Treasury in order to represent the interests of the
U.S. taxpayer. Third, when Treasury, as a shareholder in either a public or
private corporation, has the power to elect or appoint directors, it should
select at least some high-level Treasury officials to those directorships.
Unlike directors who come from the business sector, they will be able to
present the government's perspectives and concerns to management and the
other members of the board. They, in turn, will have greater knowledge
and understanding about the corporation that the government substantially
owns. Treasury's active participation in the corporate boardroom could
promote greater understanding of the respective positions of government
and business and alleviate some of the tensions and conflicts resulting from
the uneasy alliance of government and business.
32 FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., MANAGING THE CRISIS: THE FDIC AND RTC
EXPERIENCE 1980-1994, at 545-65 (1998).
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II. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE BAILOUT
LEGISLATION
A. Principles of Corporate Governance
I begin with a summary review of well-established principles of
corporate governance. A corporation's objective is "the conduct of
business activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and
shareholder gain." 3 The corporation, however, may take into account
ethical considerations and support public welfare and other purposes,
whether or not they advance the economic objective.34 Accordingly, the
corporate objective is primarily to earn profits within a broad concept of
"profits," short or long-term.
Under the accepted director primacy model,35 the board of directors has
broad discretion to determine the appropriate balancing of these
considerations. In exercising this discretion, directors are expected to act in
good faith and in the best interests of the corporation 3 6 and to live up to
their duties of loyalty37 and care.3 8 If they do so, the business judgment rule
protects the directors from liability for bad decisions. In the last two
decades, a board of directors consisting of at least a majority of
independent3 9 directors has become the model for corporate governance at
public corporations.40 Thus, in public corporations, the role of the board has
changed from determining corporate business policy (for which experience
and expertise in the specific business would be required) to monitoring the
corporate managers (for which general business experience and gravitas are
valued). The typical independent director today is an experienced
businessman, typically a retired CEO, who may sit on several other boards.
An integral function of the monitoring board is to assure that the
corporation has in place adequate systems and controls to assure that the
33 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §
2.01(a) (1994).
3 4 Id. § 2.01(b).
3s DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 14 1(a) (2010); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.0 1(b)
(2005).
36 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) (2005).
3 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2010); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.61 (2005).
38 Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963); see also
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30(b) (2005).
3 Definitions of "independent directors" are found in NASDAQ, INC., MARKET
PLACE RULES § 5605(a)(2) (2006) [hereinafter NASDAQ RULES], available at
http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/NASDAQ/pdf/new listingrules.pdf; NYSE, INC.,
LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.02 (2010) [hereinafter NYSE MANUAL].40 NASDAQ RULES § 5605(b)(1); NYSE MANUAL § 303A.01.
566 Vol. 5:2
2010 The U.S. as "Reluctant Shareholder": 567
Government, Business and the Law
corporation complies with the law 4' and adequately manages enterprise
risks.42 Even before the financial crisis, this model of corporate governance
had its critics,43 and the deficiencies in risk assessment on the part of
managers and boards of banks and financial services firms raise again the
question of the effectiveness of the monitoring board and the director
primacy model."
The role of the shareholders in corporate governance is, first and
foremost, to elect the directors and, as a corollary, to remove directors if
they have lost the confidence of the shareholders. 45 As a practical matter,
however, directors' elections are rarely contested, and directors are seldom
removed unless part of a well-funded effort to take control of the board,
frequently to redeem a poison pill.4 6 Shareholders also have the power to
veto certain major corporate decisions proposed by the board of directors,
such as a merger or sale of all the assets47 or amendments to the certificate
of incorporation.48 Consistent with their passive role, shareholders have
limited rights to obtain information about the company that is not disclosed
in SEC and other public filings. 9 In addition, shareholders generally do not
owe any duties to their fellow shareholders; they are free to act in a self-
interested manner and do not have to take into account the effect of their
actions on fellow shareholders.50  "Controlling" shareholders, however,
41 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2. I (a)(2) (2007); MODEL Bus.
CORP. ACT § 8.01(c)(iv) (2005).
42 See generally MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.0 1(c)(ii), (vi); COMM. OF SPONSORING
ORGS. OF THE TREADWAY COMM'N, EFFECTIVE ENTERPRISE RISK OVERSIGHT: THE
ROLE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS (2009).
43 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Letting Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 1784 (2006).
4See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk Management, 34 J.
CORP. L. 967, 970-71 (2009) (reporting results of a 2002 survey of corporate
directors in which forty-three percent said that their board had ineffective, or no,
process for identifying and managing risk and a 2008 survey of CFOs who
expressed concern about their own companies' risk management practices); see
also Andrew Clark, US Politicians Amazed as Ex-AIG Boss Martin Sullivan Pleads
Ignorance, GUARDIAN, July 1, 2010, at 24.
4 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141(b), (k), 211(b) (2010); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§
7.01, 808 (2005).
46 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 833, 856 (2005) (stating that outside the hostile-takeover context,
challenges to incumbent directors are rare).
4 7 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 251, 271 (2010); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § § 11.02,
12.02 (2002).
48 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242 (2010); MODEL BuS. CORP. ACT § 10.02 (2005).
49 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (2010); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 16.02, 16.04
(2005).
50 STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS § 7.4 (2002).
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUSINESS LA WJOURNAL
have equitable limitations placed on their power to extract value from the
corporation to the detriment of minority shareholders.'
In contrast to the director primacy model, shareholder activists seek a
greater voice for shareholders in corporate governance. While the
shareholder activist movement is not monolithic, an overarching theme is
greater accountability of the corporate board to the shareholders. Some
advocates for greater shareholder empowerment argue for limits on the
board's discretion in order to maximize shareholder value 5 2 and specifically
seek to curtail the board's power to adopt "poison pills" without
shareholder approval." Other advocates want to make the election of
directors a more meaningful exercise of shareholder voting rights by
allowing shareholders access to the management proxy statement for
nomination of directors.54 In recent years, many shareholder groups have
focused on generous executive compensation packages for senior
management and advocate for a nonbinding shareholder vote on
compensation ("say on pay").55 Shareholder activism, however, is not a call
for a radical restructuring of the corporate norm, but rather argues for some
limitations on board power in order to realize shareholder value or achieve
greater accountability.56
Finally, although creditors are not formally part of the corporate
governance structure, major creditors can wield considerable power
because they can negotiate for controls on the corporation to protect their
investment that are more extensive than those possessed by shareholders."
Creditors owe no fiduciary duties to the corporation or its shareholders.
51 Id.
52 Bebchuk, supra note 46, at 911.
5 See, e.g., Bebchuk v. CA, Inc., 902 A.2d 737, 739, 743 (Del. Ch. 2006).
54 See, e.g., Corporate Governance Policies, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTORS, § 3.2, http://www.cii.org/UserFiles/file/CII%2OCorp%2OGov%20
Policies%20Full%20and%20Current%2009-29-10%20FINAL.pdf (last updated
Sept. 29, 2010).
5s In response, Congress required TARP recipients to adopt say-on-pay, see infra
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF
PROGRAM, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 118 (July 21, 2009) [hereinafter
SIGTARP, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS July 2009]; see infra note 72 and
accompanying text.
56See, e.g., About the Council, THE COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS
http://www.cii.org/about (last visited July 21, 2010) (stating that "[g]ood corporate
governance is a system of checks and balances that fosters transparency,
responsibility, accountability and market integrity").
5 See generally Kelli A. Alces, Strategic Governance, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 1053
(2008).
58 See N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d
92, 99 (Del. 2007).
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As I discuss later, the government embraced the director primacy
model, with its emphasis on independent directors overseeing the business
and a "hands-off' shareholder policy. The government, however, has not
exercised its power as a significant shareholder to nominate and elect
directors charged with the responsibility to represent the U.S. taxpayers'
interests in the boardroom.
We turn next to Congressional legislation authorizing the bailout to
ascertain Congress's expectations with respect to corporate governance.
B. The Bailout Legislation
In EESA, Congress made clear its expectation that Treasury would
seek to maximize investment returns in order to minimize the impact on the
national debt. 9 Consistent with this, it specifically directed Treasury, when
providing assistance to an exchange-traded financial institution, to take an
equity interest to allow for the potential of upside gain.60  Congress,
however, did not expect that Treasury would exercise rights as a
shareholder; the statute directs the Treasury Secretary to agree not to
exercise voting power if it acquires voting stock.' It is not clear why
Congress did not want Treasury to vote; it may reflect either a general
disinclination on policy grounds or a specific distrust of how the executive
department might exercise voting power. It is incongruous, however, to
adopt a policy of shareholder maximization while denying the shareholder
voting power. As we will see later, the government has exercised its voting
rights, albeit in a limited fashion.
Congress also attached conditions to TARP assistance, the most
significant of which relate to controls on executive compensation. All
TARP recipients are subject to executive compensation restrictions. So
long as the TARP recipient has an outstanding "obligation" to the federal
government, it must comply with guidelines on executive compensation
promulgated by Treasury, currently set forth in its Interim Final Rule on
TARP Standards for Compensation and Corporate Governance (the
"Rule"). 62 Treasury created the Office of Special Master for TARP
Executive Compensation (the "Special Master"), whose responsibilities
include reviewing and approving executive compensation of TARP
recipients, as follows:
59 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 § 103(1), 12 U.S.C.A. § 5213
(West 2006).
60 12 U.S.C. § 5223 (2006).
61 id
62 OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF
PROGRAM, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 101 (Jan. 2010) [hereinafter
SIGTARP, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS Jan. 2010].
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* Review and approve any payments of compensation for their five
senior executive officers ("SEOs") and twenty next highly paid
employees of TARP recipients that have received "exceptional
assistance;"63
* Review and approve the structure of compensation of TARP
recipients that have received exceptional assistance for their
hundred most highly paid employees;6
* Review bonuses, retention awards, and other compensation paid to
SEOs and the twenty next most highly paid employees before
February 17, 2009, by all TARP recipients and, where appropriate,
negotiate reimbursements;
* Provide advisory opinions with respect to the application of the
Rule and whether compensation payments and plans are consistent
with law and the public interest.65
The Special Master is required to use specific principles in his review
of compensation arrangements, including:
* "risk-the compensation structure should avoid incentives for
employees to take unnecessary or excessive risks that could
threaten the value of the TARP recipient..."
* "tax payer return-the compensation structure ... should reflect the
need for the TARP recipient to remain a competitive enterprise, to
retain and recruit talented employees who will contribute to the
TARP recipient's future success, and ultimately to be able to repay
TARP obligations." 66
Other relevant considerations include appropriate allocation of the
components of compensation (salary, pensions, bonuses and incentives),
performance-based compensation, comparable structures and payments, and
employee contribution to the TARP recipient's value.
63 Recipients of exceptional assistance include AIG, GM, GMAC, and Chrysler. It
previously included Citigroup and Bank of America. See SIGTARP QUARTERLY
REPORT TO CONGRESS July 2009, supra note 55, at 123.
64 According to the Treasury, this is to ensure that compensation is fair and
structured, to protect taxpayer interests and to promote long-term shareholder
value. Id.
65 SIGTARP, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS Jan. 2010, supra note 62, at 102.
66 SIGTARP, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS July 2009, supra note 55, at 122.67 Id. at 123; see also Compensation in the Financial Industry-Government
Perspectives: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. (2010)
(testimony of Kenneth R. Feinberg, Special Master for TARP Exec. Comp., U.S.
Department of the Treasury) (describing the variables and considerations at issue
when determining whether compensation levels or structures are appropriate).
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In addition, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
(ARRA) , as implemented by the Rule, provides for additional controls on
executive compensation. Each TARP recipient must establish a board
compensation committee consisting of independent directors, whose
responsibilities include meeting at least semi-annually to review with senior
risk officers the proposed compensation plans of all employees and to
ensure that the TARP recipient is not unnecessarily exposed to risk.69 In
addition, the committee must evaluate SEO compensation plans to ensure
that the plans do not encourage the SEOs to take unnecessary and excessive
risks that could threaten the value of the TARP recipient and file reports
with the Treasury on its work.70
TARP recipients also are required, under ARRA: to permit an annual
non-binding vote by the shareholders on executive compensation ("say on
pay") as required by SEC regulations;71 to adopt company-wide policies to
define and prevent excessive expenditures on entertainment and other
"luxury" expenses; 72 and to require that bonuses paid to SEOs and the next
twenty most highly paid employees be subject to a clawback if the payment
was based on materially inaccurate performance criteria.7 ' Golden
parachute payments to a SEO or the next five mostly highly paid employees
are prohibited.74
In addition to the Congressionally mandated provisions, Treasury
imposed additional requirements to protect shareholder value and increase
transparency, including a prohibition on tax gross-ups, a requirement that
TARP recipients provide additional disclosure of perquisites, a requirement
that TARP recipients provide disclosure about compensation consultants,
and certification and reporting requirements.7 5
The restrictions on executive compensation reflect Congressional and
public anger over large compensation packages paid to executives of failed
firms,7 6 as well as the conventional wisdom that many forms of
68 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), Pub. L. No. 111-5,
123 Stat. 115 (codified in scattered sections and titles of U.S.C.).
69 SIGTARP, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS July 2009, supra note 55, at 124.
0 Id.
72 id.
n Id. at 121. The rule also requires that the TARP recipient exercise its clawback
rights unless it can demonstrate that it would be unreasonable to do so.
74 id
751 Id. at 125-26.
76 See, e.g., Michael Lewis, Mass Hysteria Over AIG Obscures Simple Truths,
BLOOMBERG, Mar. 20, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
20601039&sid=atlHxXH7FweQ ("[T]he one thing you can do right now in
Washington without getting an argument is to rail against the ethics of AIG's bonus
payment.").
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performance-based incentive compensation encouraged managers to engage
in excessive risk-taking by focusing on stock price as a measure of
performance.77 Congress consistently stated that these provisions were
necessary to restore shareholder trust,78 but it is an open question whether
Congress intended to adopt a corporate governance model with greater
emphasis on shareholder rights or was simply responding to constituents'
anger. Assuming Congress did intend the former, the legislative measures
are not radical measures. The government can veto executive
compensation only of those companies receiving "exceptional assistance;"
with respect to other TARP recipients, the Special Master's power is strictly
jaw-boning.79 Exchange-traded corporations have been required since the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) to have independent compensation
committees;s0 clawbacks were first instituted in SOX;8i and "say on pay"
resolutions have routinely been included on management proxy
statements.82 Nevertheless, some corporations found these conditions
sufficiently burdensome that they created an incentive to repay the TARP
funds, and most large bank recipients repaid their TARP funds in order to
81get out from these restrictions.
The Dodd-Frank Act that is intended to provide long-term solutions to
these problems gives the best evidence of the current Congressional
commitment to corporate governance reform. The Act contains provisions
n7 See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder
Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 653 (2010). But see Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta
Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation: Simplicity, Transparency and
Committing to the Long-Term 3 (Yale Law & Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
393, 2009), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1506742 (stating that best
available evidence suggests that incentive compensation did not affect performance
of financial institutions during the financial crisis).
78 See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 77, at 657 (quoting former SEC Chairman
Arthur Levitt that "the subprime collapse, the Bear Steams implosion, and
revelations of poor risk management at large financial firms 'had injected a
dangerously large degree of mistrust into markets,' and that restoring the
shareholder voice 'would go a long way in helping to restore trust"').
79 SIGTARP, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS Jan. 2010, supra note 62, at 102-
05. Mr. Feinberg maintains a mandatory role in TARP recipients that have received
"exceptional assistance," including the review of the payments of compensation
and the structure of the payments for the 100 most highly compensated employees.
Mr. Feinberg plays an advisory role in his review of prior payments and in his
"interpretation" of current compensation plans at all TARP recipient institutions.
80 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002); 15
U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)(3)(A) (2002).
8 15 U.S.C. § 7243(a)(1) (2006).
82 See, e.g., Marathon Oil Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2010 WL 147282 (Jan. 8,
2010).
83 Bank ofAmerica to Repay TARP, Raise Cash, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 2, 2009,
available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34245560/ns/business-us business/.
572 Vol. 5:2
2010 The U.S. as "Reluctant Shareholder": 573
Government, Business and the Law
on executive compensation, compensation committees and "say on pay"
that are substantially the same as those in the TARP legislation.84 The Act
also adds additional disclosures85 and authorization for the SEC to grant
shareholders proxy access to nominate directors.8 6 Most likely, Congress
viewed these provisions as symbolic of shareholder protection rather than
effecting meaningful change.
C. The Administration's Guiding Principles
Consistent with the Congressional directive to take equity investments
to maximize investment return,8 7 most outstanding TARP funds, as of mid-
2010, are in the form of equity ownership in troubled companies,
principally in common and preferred stock. Specifically, the U.S.
government holds substantial interests in two public corporations: 79.77%
of the voting power of AIG89 and approximately eighteen percent of the
common stock of Citigroup (down from 33.6% at December 2009).90 The
government also owns majority interests in two private corporations-
60.8% of GM 9'and 56.3% of Ally 92 as well as a 9.85% interest in Chrysler,
also a private corporation. The voting interest in AIG is in the form of a
preferred stock; the equity interests in Citigroup, GM, Chrysler and Ally are
in common shares. The decision to take these substantial holdings in
common shares was driven by the inability of the firms to take on more
debt given the precarious condition of their balance sheets. The necessity
for financial services firms to maintain minimum levels of capital placed an
upper limit on the amount of Citigroup's and Ally's debt, 94 and GM and
84 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 951-54, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (July 2010) (to be codified in scattered sections and
titles of U.S.C.).
85 Id. § 955 (employee and director hedging); id. § 956 (compensation structure);
id. § 972 (chairman and CEO structures).86 Id. § 971 (proxy access).
87 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
88 SIGTARP, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS Apr. 2010, supra note 3, at 34.
89 OFS FINANCIAL REPORT 2009, supra note 19, at 27.
90 SIGTARP, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS Jan. 2010, supra note 62, at 72.
91 U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM: THE
U.S. GOVERNMENT ROLE AS SHAREHOLDER IN AIG, CITIGROUP, CHRYSLER, AND
GENERAL MOTORS AND PRELIMINARY VIEWS ON ITS INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT
ACTIVITIES, GAL-10-3257, at 11 (2009) [hereinafter GAO, THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT ROLE AS SHAREHOLDER].
92 SIGTARP, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS Apr. 2010, supra note 3, at 116.
9 See GAO, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ROLE AS SHAREHOLDER, supra note 91, at 11.
94 Government infusions of additional capital followed the government's spring
2009 stress testing of banks. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury,
Statement From Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner Regarding the Treasury Capital
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Chrysler, emerging from government-engineered bankruptcies, needed
infusions of capital. Thus, the business needs dictated the form of
investment as least as much as the Congressional goal of maximizing
taxpayers' gain.
Indeed, Treasury has repeatedly stated it is a "reluctant shareholder." 96
In its mission statement it states: "We want to see the capital base of our
financial system return to private hands as quickly as possible, while
preserving financial stability and promoting economic recovery." 9 7
Treasury has set forth its Managing Guiding Principles as follows:
* Protect taxpayer investments and maximize overall investment
returns within competing constraints;
* Promote stability for and prevent disruption of financial markets
and economy;
* Bolster market confidence to increase private capital investment;
* Dispose of investments as soon as practicable in a timely and
orderly manner that minimizes financial market and economic
impact.98
These principles, however, do not acknowledge the intractable conflicts
confronting the government as shareholder. The first principle, for
example, calls for "protecting" the investment-which suggests a
conservative business strategy-while at the same time "maximizing"
returns, which connotes an aggressive business strategy, all within
amorphous "competing constraints." Consistent with its position that it is a
"reluctant shareholder," the fourth principle calls for prompt divestiture, but
it has to minimize market and economic impact. The second and third
principles reflect concerns beyond investment returns and focus instead on
a general policy goal-the well-being of capital markets. If these principles
all carry equal weight (and Treasury has not indicated that it weights them),
then there are potentially serious conflicts that Treasury has not
acknowledged in its dual roles as shareholder and "steward of the U.S.
Assistance Program and the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (May 7,
2009), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/tgl23.htm.
9s See infra notes 198-200 and accompanying text. It is not clear why the
government felt the necessity of putting so much capital into Ally. See infra note
240 and accompanying text.
96 OFS FINANCIAL REPORT 2009, supra note 19, at 42.
9 Press Release U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Treasury Department Releases Text of
Letter from Secretary Geithner to Hill Leadership on Administration's Exit
Strategy for TARP (Dec. 9, 2009), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/
releases/tg433.htm.
98 OFS FINANCIAL REPORT 2009, supra note 19, at 39-40.
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economic and financial systems,"99 conflicts that are exacerbated because
of its power as controlling shareholder and its concomitant obligation to
other shareholders.
Finally, Treasury articulates a policy of shareholder restraint. It has
stated that, in its view, it would be inappropriate to exercise its voting
power except on matters that directly pertain to its responsibility under
EESA to manage its investments in a manner that protects the taxpayer.' 00
Treasury thus has adopted the prevailing corporate governance model of
director primacy:' 0 ' a strong board of directors, no interference in day-to-
day management decisions, and limited voting rights on core shareholder
issues.10 2
Treasury imposed additional requirements on those companies
receiving "exceptional assistance,"' 0 3  including internal controls,
monitoring and reporting requirements, and additional restrictions on
expenditures."' Creditors and senior security holders frequently bargain
for such protections, and they are appropriate for the protection of the
government investments. In addition, employees from Treasury's Office of
Financial Stability (OFS) have met with exceptional assistance corporations
to discuss the company's governance structure and processes related to
TARP requirements.105
III. THE GOVERNMENT AS SHAREHOLDER: PAST AND PRESENT
In this Part, I describe specifically how the government has acted in its
role of shareholder. I begin, for the sake of comparison, with the FDIC's
acquisition, in 1984, of an eighty percent interest in the public holding
company of Continental Illinois and then proceed to examine the 2008-09
bailouts of AIG, Citigroup, the automakers, and Ally.
99 Duties & Functions of the U.S. Department of Treasury, U.S. DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY, http://www.ustreas.gov/education/duties/ (last update May 25, 2010)
100 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Treasury Announces Voting of its
Shares at Citigroup Annual Meeting (Apr. 20, 2010), available at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/tg647.htm.
1o1 See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 14 1(a); supra note 35 and accompanying text.
102 GAO, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ROLE AS SHAREHOLDER, supra note 91, at 12.
103 AIG, GM, GMAC and Chrysler were exceptional assistance recipients.
Citigroup repaid its exceptional assistance loans in December 2009. SIGTARP,
QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS Jan. 2010, supra note 62, at 135-36.
'0 Id. at 135.
Id.
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A. Continental Illinois
The FDIC's 1984 bailout of Continental Illinois engendered
controversy, coined the phrase "too big to fail," 06 and raised concerns
about moral hazard.'0 7 In that bailout the FDIC assumed eighty percent
control of Continental Illinois Corporation (CIC), Continental Illinois's
publicly traded holding company. Its story is worth recounting in some
detail as it provides the closest parallel to the current government
interventions.
In March 31, 1984, Continental Illinois had over $40 billion in assets
and was the seventh largest bank in the United States in both assets and
deposits.'0 8 Unfortunately, it achieved this growth through an aggressive
lending policy that ultimately caused the bank's downfall; from 1982-1984
the bank's non-performing assets had significantly increased, and the
holding company's stock price tumbled. In May 1984, rumors of the
bank's imminent failure led to a run on the bank, and the FDIC intervened
with interim assistance. When the FDIC's attempts to arrange an assisted
acquisition of the bank with private institutions and investors proved
unsuccessful,' 09 it worked out, in July 1984, a permanent solution to
address the potential deposit run that faced the bank." 0
According to the head of the FDIC at the time, there were two key
components of the program: "top management changes" and "substantial
financial aid.""' With respect to the second component, the FDIC took a
number of actions. These included the removal of non-performing
"'troubled loans' from the bank"l2 and the implementation of provisions to
provide funding for its banking operations and to increase its capital
106 The phrase referred to differential treatment of banks depending on their size
and the resulting perceptions of inequity. Lee Davison, Continental Illinois and
"Too Big To Fail, " in 1 HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES-LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 235,
236 (1997).
107 Inquiries into Continental Illinois Corporation and Continental Illinois National
Bank: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. Supervision, Regulation and
Ins. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Fin. and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong. 382 (1984)
[hereinafter Hearings].
1o8 FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Co., in
MANAGING THE CRISIS: THE FDIC AND RTC EXPERIENCE 1980-1994, at 545, 546
(1998).
' 1985 FDIC, ANN. REP. 4 (1985).
"
0 FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 108, at 552. The plan was not officially
implemented until September 26, 1984, after shareholders of the Continental
holding company gave the required approval of the assistance package.
"'Hearings, supra note 107, at 461.
112 1985 FDIC, supra note 109, at 43. FDIC entered into an asset management
contract with the bank to liquidate the portfolio. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra
note 108, at 555.
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base.113 The FDIC purchased two separate issues of preferred stock in CIC:
first, the FDIC purchased a $720 million issue of permanent, nonvoting,
junior preferred stock.1 14 This preferred stock was convertible upon a sale
to a third party into 160 million shares of common stock, which effectively
gave the FDIC control of eighty percent of the common stock."
Furthermore, the FDIC purchased $280 million of permanent, adjustable-
rate, cumulative preferred stock (11.2 million shares) of CIC.116 The FDIC
took non-voting shares to signal that it did not intend to hold these positions
for a significant amount of time.'17  The FDIC also acquired a "make
whole" option that gave it the power, after five years, to purchase 100% of
the outstanding CIC shares at a nominal price if the FDIC suffered losses
exceeding $800 million under the loan purchase agreement."' The FDIC
exercised the "make whole" arrangement on October 24, 1989 and
purchased from the holding company the remaining 10.1 million shares.119
The FDIC retained its holdings for almost seven years until May 1991,120
when it announced a public sale of its remaining equity holdings.121
The FDIC established several guiding principles with respect to
corporate governance. First, as noted above, "top management changes"
were important, both to strengthen the bank's management and to hold
accountable those responsible for the bank's disastrous lending policies.
The FDIC not only required appointment of a new Chief Executive Officer
and a new chairman of the Board of Directors,' 22 it recruited and selected
the new officers.12 3 It also insisted on the removal of those directors who
were on the board during the years the bank adopted its disastrous
expansion policy, in order to "send a message about directors'
responsibilities."12 4 Second, the FDIC made assurances that it did not seek
113 FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 108, at 553.
114 id
116 id.
117 Davison, supra note 106, at 248 n.44.
118 FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 108, at 553. There was also an option that
the FDIC could exercise based on smaller losses: "If the FDIC suffered loss under
the loan purchase agreement, or in the carrying costs and cost of collection, the
FDIC could exercise its option rights in proportional amounts according to the
amount of that loss. The purchase price was to be calculated on the basis of one
share of stock for every $20 of the FDIC's stock."
119 Davison, supra note 106, at 557.
120 June 1984-May 1991.
121 1991 FDIC, ANN. REP. 13. The FDIC had a twenty-six percent equity interest
that it sold at that time.
122 FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 108, at 552.
123 IRVINE E. SPRAGUE, BAILOUT: AN INSIDER'S AccoUNT OF BANK FAILURES AND
RESCUES 200-209 (1986) (describing FDIC's selection of new management).
124 Id. at 215.
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to "nationalize" Continental, but rather sought either to minimize costs
associated with the aid package or maximize the return on the FDIC
investment.12 5 To this end, while the FDIC effectively had an eighty
percent interest in the holding company, the stock had no voting rights
while owned by FDIC, although it had a veto power over the nomination of
any director.126 Third, the FDIC stated repeatedly that it did not seek to
interfere with day-to-day operations, but rather sought only to exercise
influence in limited areas, such as board hiring and proposed mergers.' 27 in
these ways, the FDIC sought to exercise control to achieve the bank's
timely recovery and recover its investment, but to avoid direct involvement
that would signal a "nationalized" bank. Despite this balancing act, both
the banking community and Continental Illinois expressed concerns about
potential competitive disadvantages because of perceptions that the bank
was a "nationalized" bank. 2 '
Ultimately, the bailout cost the FDIC approximately $1.1 billion.'29 It
also established principles that were applicable in the 2008-2009
interventions.
B. AIG
AIG suffered about $22 billion in losses principally related to credit
default swaps on mortgage-related assets and was technically insolvent in
September 2008.130 Through a series of complicated transactions, Treasury
and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FedNY) provided financial
assistance to AIG in excess of $180 billion.131 As a result of the financing,
Treasury owns, through a Trust established for its benefit, preferred shares
that have 79.77% of the voting power.13 2 In addition, because AIG missed
four quarterly dividends on two other classes of preferred shares owned by
Treasury, Treasury exercised its right in April 2010 to appoint two
125 Hearings, supra note 107, at 465. After the fact, the head of the FDIC at the
time described the bailout as "nationalization." William M. Isaac, Bank
Nationalization Isn't the Answer, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 2009, at Al 3.
126 Hearings, supra note 107, at 461; FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 108, at
550.
127 Hearings, supra note 107, at 461. In the less formal and unofficial account,
however, Sprague makes it clear that the FDIC would not allow the bank to fail,
SPRAGUE, supra note 123, at 206.
128 Davison, supra note 106, at 556-57.
29 Id. at 558.
o3 0 Am. Int'l Group, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Nov. 10, 2008).
131 See William K. Sjostrom, The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 943
(2009) (setting forth the terms of the government bailout).
132 Am. Int'l Group, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 10 (Apr.
12, 2010) [hereinafter AIG, Proxy Statement Apr. 2010].
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additional directors.133 Thus, the Trust controls AIG, and, as stated in the
AIG proxy statement, "the interests of the Trust and the U.S. Treasury may
not be the same as the interests of AIG's other shareholders."l34
Following the Continental Illinois policy of "top management
changes," the government insisted, as a condition of the September 22,
2008 financing, on the resignation of CEO Robert Willumstad (who had
been CEO for less than four months) and selected Edward Liddy, formerly
CEO at AllState, as the new CEO and Chairman of the Board.'13 Mr. Liddy
came out of retirement to accept the position as a "public service" and
received a nominal $1 per year salary.13 6 There was also considerable
turnover on the board of directors from September 2008 through May 2009.
Besides Mr. Willumstad, seven AIG directors resigned or announced they
would not run for reelection.'3 ' At the first annual meeting at which the
government was a controlling shareholder, held on June 30, 2009, the board
of directors nominated, and the shareholders elected, six independent
directors. By the June 12, 2010 annual meeting, there were only three (out
of eleven) directors up for election by the common shareholders whose
tenures predated the bailout.
The board of directors nominated all the directors elected by the
shareholders at the 2010 annual meeting. While we do not know the extent
of the government's influence on the selection of the nominees, the
Trustees who vote the government shares testified before Congress in May
2009 that they were actively recruiting new directors'38 and had
'11 Am. Int'l Group, Inc. (Form 8-K) (Apr. 1, 2010).
134 AIG, Proxy Statement Apr. 2010, supra note 132, at 10.
'
35 AIG: Where is the Taxpayer's Money Going?: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Oversight and Gov't Reform, 111th Cong. 15-22 (2009) [hereinafter AIG: Where is
the Taxpayer's Money Going?] (statement of Edward Liddy, Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer, American International Group).
136 Mary Williams Walsh, Leave Executive Drafted to Run A.I. G., Will Step Down,
N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2009, at B 1 (Mr. Liddy announced his resignation on May
21, 2009, stating that the job was "too big and complex" for one person and that the
company and federal government would not find anyone else to take the position at
a nominal salary). The board of directors selected Robert Benmosche, a former
CEO at MetLife, as the CEO in August 2009. Liam Pleven et al., AIG Selects Ex-
Chief of MetLife as CEO, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 2009, at C1.
'3 Fred Langhammer (Oct. 28, 2009), Edmund Tse (Mar. 25, 2009), Virginia
Rometty and Michael Sutton (May 7, 2009), Stephen Bollenbach, Martin Feldstein
and James Orr (May 21, 2009). Another director (Dennis Dammerman) resigned
Feb. 28, 2010.
38 AIG: Where is the Taxpayer's Money Going?, supra note 135, at 75-85
(statement of the Trustees of the AIG Credit Facility Trust: Hearing on the
Collapse and Federal Rescue of AIG Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't
Reform); see also Am. Int'l Group, Inc., Mission Statement of the Trustees of the
AIG Credit Facility Trust, INFORMATION ABOUT THE AIG TRUSTEES 2,
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recommended five nominees to the board.139 In addition, we can make the
logical assumption that AIG would not nominate any director who did not
have at least tacit government approval. Accordingly, looking at the
directors who assumed office after September 2008 gives us a sense of the
characteristics the government looks for in directors. Besides CEO Robert
Benmosche, there are seven directors elected by the shareholders at the
2010 shareholders meeting who joined the board after September 2008. Six
of these seven directors are men; the median age is sixty-four. Six are
retired CEOs or other senior management; one is currently senior
management. The median service on other boards is two. The principal
areas of expertise identified by the board were: restructuring (five times);
finance (five times); managing large, complex, international institutions
(four times); and professional experience in financial services industry (four
times); accounting, risk management, and experience in airline and aircraft
industries were also identified.140 The two directors who were appointed by
Treasury directly141 fit the same profile; both are male retired CEOs of
approximately the same age.14 2 In short, the new AIG directors are a very
homogeneous group who fit the template of the independent director in a
publicly traded corporation: a predominately white, male cohort of retired
CEOs who also serve on several other corporate boards.
AIG is the only government investment in which the shares were placed
in a Trust. FedNY, which provided the initial federal assistance to AIG, set
up the Trust and appointed the initial three Trustees, two of whom have
significant connections with FedNY. 143 The Trust Agreement states that
this arrangement was chosen "to avoid any possible conflict with FedNY's
http://www.aigcreditfacilitytrust.com/aigweb/intemet/en/files/Mission%20Stateme
nt_tcml 121-242395.pdf (last visited May 5, 2010) [hereinafter Mission Statement
of the Trusstees] (the Trustees' Mission Statement identifies as their primary initial
focus "to ensure that AIG has a capable and effective board of directors.").
139 AIG: Where is the Taxpayer's Money Going?, supra note 135, at 119 (statement
of Douglas L. Foshee).
140 AIG, Proxy Statement Apr. 2010, supra note 132.
141 The Treasury was able to appoint these two directors directly because of its
ownership of two other series of preferred shares.
142 These two directors have less service on other boards (one and zero).
143 Jill M. Considine is the former Chairman, the Depository Trust & Clearing
Corporation and a former member of the New York Fed Board of Directors.
Chester B. Feldberg is the former Chairman, Barclays Americas and was
previously employed by the New York Fed for thirty-six years. Douglas L. Foshee,
who resigned in February 2010, is the President and CEO of El Paso Corporation
and Chair of the Board of Directors of the Houston Branch of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Dallas. Foshee was replaced by Peter A. Langerman, Chairman, President
and CEO of the Mutual Series fund group of Franklin Templeton. See Biographies,
Information about the AIG Trustees, AM. INT'L GROUP, INC. (Mar. 3, 2010),
http://www.aigcreditfacilitytrust.com/Bios1 121_239155.html.
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supervisory and monetary policy functions."'" In addition, use of the Trust
may have been viewed as a way to deal with conflicts resulting from the
government's dual roles as both a lender and shareholder or to minimize
political meddling in corporate affairs. Finally, the use of the Trust may be
an effort to distance the government from AIG governance because of
aversion to "nationalizing" a private business.14 1
The Trustees have two principal responsibilities: to improve corporate
governancel 46 and to dispose of the stock.147 While the Trust Agreement
purports to give the Trustees broad discretion, their actual powers have
significant limitations.148 Most pertinently, the Trust Agreement prohibits
the Trustees from becoming AIG directors.149  Moreover, the Trust
Agreement provides direction to the Trustees. It states that "in exercising
their discretion . . . the Trustees are advised that it is the FedNY's view"
that (1) maximizing the company's ability to repay the government and (2)
being managed in a manner that will not disrupt financial market conditions
are consistent with maximizing share value.5 o With respect to the
disposition of the shares, the Trustees are required to develop a divestiture
plan with the goal of disposing of the shares "in a value maximizing
manner."'' Ultimately, the decision to dispose of the shares rests with the
government, since any disposition of the shares is subject to the prior
approval of FedNY, after its consultation with Treasury.152
To date, the Trustees have sought to keep a low profile and have
resisted attempts to engage them in the public debate and controversy over
AIG. The Trustees testified at a congressional hearing in spring 2009 (one
of their few public statements about their role)153 and acknowledged that
they were operating in "uncharted waters."' 54 They identified their first
priority as enhancing corporate governance to restore public confidence in
14 AM. INT'L GROUP, INC., AIG CREDIT FACLrrY TRUST AGREEMENT 2 (2009).
145 id
146 The purchase agreement obligates AIG and its board of directors to "work in
good faith with the Trustees to ensure corporate governance arrangements
satisfactory to the Trustees." Am. Int'l Group, Inc., (Form 8-K) (Mar. 5, 2009).
147 AM. INT'L GROUP, INC., supra note 144, § 2.05.
14 8 Id. at 2. Under the Trust Agreement, the Trustees have "absolute discretion and
control" over the shares, subject to its terms.
149 AM. INT'L GROUP, INC., supra note 144, § 2.04(f). In addition, the Trustees may
not vote to elect any director who has been, within the past year, an officer, director
or senior employee of FedNY or Treasury. Id. § 2.04(e).
"s Id. § 2.04(d).
'' Id. § 2.05(a)(ii).
152 Id. § 2.05(a)(iii).
153 AIG: Where is the Taxpayer's Money Going?, supra note 135.
154 Id at 75.
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the company and, to this end, they were actively recruiting new directors 55
and had recommended five nominees to the board.'5 6 They requested then-
CEO Liddy to undertake a review and develop a comprehensive
compensation policy.'57 They reviewed the adequacy of financial and
accounting controls and the financial reporting process'58 and engaged in
working sessions with AIG management, FedNY and Treasury on the
company's business plan.159  They emphasized they were a "staff of
three,"160 and because of the government's monitoring of AIG, they
believed it was not cost-effective for them to hire staff or consultants to
assist them in their efforts.16' They testified that it was premature to
develop a plan for disposition of the shares; when that eventuality became
imminent, they would engage experts to assist with the process.16 2 When
Congressional members asked about their views on the business plan, the
Trustees' response was a polite, but firm "not our job."6  Indeed, some
Committee members expressed frustration and confusion over the Trustees'
activities, with Chairman Towns asking them what was their role.16
Other attempts to involve the Trustees in public debate over AIG have
failed. An activist shareholder urged their support for its shareholder
resolution on executive compensation; the Trustees supported management
and voted against the resolution.165 Eliot Spitzer, the former Governor of
New York who has become something of a corporate gadfly,166 urged the
Trustees to put pressure on the board of directors to disclose non-privileged
AIG emails to permit an "open source" investigation;'67 the Trustees did not
publicly respond.
Although the Trustees have maintained a low profile, the involvement
of government in its roles as creditor and regulator has been more intrusive
1ss Id. at 118. Similarly, the Trustees' Mission Statement identifies as their primary
initial focus "to ensure that AIG has a capable and effective board of directors."
Am. Int'l Group, Inc., supra note 138.
156 AIG: Where is the Taxpayer's Money Going?, supra note 135, at 119 (statement
of Douglas L. Foshee).
157Id. at 83. Although they requested him to report back to them regularly, I have
not found any follow-up on this.
5 1Id. at 84.
15 soid.
160 Id. at 135.
161 Id.
162 id
163 Id. at 134-36.
'6Id. at 134 ("What is your role in trying to turn this around?").
165 Am. Int'l Group, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Aug. 7, 2009).
166 See, e.g., Eliot Spitzer, The Incentives Catastrophe, SLATE, June 23, 2010,
http://www.slate.com/id/2257955.
167 Eliot Spitzer, Frank Partnoy & William Black, Op-Ed., Show Us the E-Mail,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2009, at WK9.
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and, in some instances, the source of considerable tension for AIG
management. In its role as creditor, FedNY maintains on-site monitoring of
AIG; according to the AIG website, "[a]s creditor, the FRBNY monitors the
implementation of AIG's restructuring and divestiture plan and participates
as an observer in the corporate governance of AIG."'68  Because AIG
received "exceptional assistance" under TARP, AIG is subject to special
conditions regarding executive compensation, company expenses and
lobbying, for which Treasury has responsibility to monitor compliance. 69
In addition, the Special Master must approve compensation payments to
AIG's top five SEOs and twenty next highly paid employees.o70  The
Special Master's determinations on AIG executive compensation so upset
the newly appointed CEO Robert Benmosche in November 2009 that he
threatened to resign even before starting,171 and AIG Chairman Harvey
Golub criticized some of the Special Master's determinations as making
"little business sense." 72
In addition, critics have questioned the motives behind some of the
government's regulatory actions.' 73 Perhaps the most controversial instance
were allegations that FedNY reviewed and edited AIG's SEC filings to
cover up details of some transactions, to avoid political fallout from the fact
that FedNY paid AIG counterparties (including Goldman Sachs) full value
to terminate their credit default swaps.174 FedNY insisted that its actions
168 Government Investment, AM. INT'L GROUP, INC., www.aigcorporate.com/
GlinAIG/role trustees.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2010).
169 See OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF
PROGRAM, TREASURY'S MONITORING OF COMPLIANCE WITH TARP REQUIREMENTS
BY COMPANIES RECEIVING SPECIAL ASSISTANCE, SIGTARP 10-007, at 5-9 (July
29, 2010) (criticizing compliance implementation as too slow, overly reliant on the
companies to self-report and inadequately staffed).
170 SIGTARP, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS Jan. 2010, supra note 62, at
102-05.
171 Anastasia Kelly, AIG's General Counsel, did resign because of Mr. Feinberg's
reduction of her base salary. Carol Loomis, Inside the Crisis at AIG, CNNMONEY,
Feb. 18, 2010, http://money.cnn.com/2010/02/17/news/companies/aigbailout_
kelly.fortune/index.htm?postversion=2010021815.
172 Press Release, Harvey Golub, Chairman, Am. Int'l Group, Inc., Chairman's
Message (Feb. 26, 2010), available at http://www.aigcorporate.com/investors/
AIGO9AR-Chairman.pdf.
' See OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF
PROGRAM, EXTENT OF FEDERAL AGENCIES' OVERSIGHT OF AIG COMPENSATION
VARIED, AND IMPORTANT CHALLENGES REMAIN, at 16 (Oct. 14, 2009). Treasury
also received considerable criticism for not taking action to prevent the payment of
bonuses, in March 2009, to AIG employees, although the payments were not
prohibited under EESA and ARRA.
174 See OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF
PROGRAM, FACTORS AFFECTING EFFORTS TO LIMIT PAYMENTS TO AIG
COUNTERPARTIES (Nov. 17, 2009). The House Oversight & Government Reform
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were taken to protect the taxpayers' investment. 17 5 Whether or not there is
any truth to these allegations, the controversy illustrates the suspicion that
surrounds governmental involvement in private business and illustrates the
need for greater transparency.
If we compare the Continental Illinois guiding principles with the
government's actions in AIG, the significant difference is that in the former
case the shares held by the FDIC had no voting power, while the AIG
shares have voting power-although the government chose not to exercise
the votes directly. The use of the Trust Agreement suggests that, at least at
the time of the AIG bailout, the government was uncomfortable in its role
as shareholder. In other respects, the principles remain the same: replace
the CEO and some of the directors and assert a "hands-off' policy on
operational decisions while exerting considerable control behind the scenes.
C. Citigroup
Citigroup became a financial super-firm through the 1998 merger of
Citicorp and Travelers Group Inc., a combination that brought about the
repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, the law that had previously
separated commercial and investment banking.'7 6  Ten years later,
Citigroup was financially devastated as a result of its aggressive activity in
the securitized mortgage market.17 7 In fall 2008, Treasury expended forty-
five billion dollars in TARP funding to Citigroup in the form of preferred
shares and warrants.17 1 In July 2009, at the request of Citigroup, the
government converted a portion of its preferred shares into common stock
because the Federal Reserve stress test found that Citigroup needed
Committee held a hearing addressing this issue on January 27, 2010. The Federal
Bailout ofAIG: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform,
111th Cong. (2010) (statements of Timothy F. Geithner, Secretary, U.S. Treasury
Deparment & Thomas C. Baxter, Executive Vice President and General Counsel,
Federal Reserve Bank of N.Y.).
'7s Factors Affecting Efforts to Limit Payments to AIG Counterparties: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform, 111th Cong. 13 (2010)
(statement of Thomas C. Baxter, Executive Vice President and General Counsel of
the Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.).
176 See Robert Schmidt & Jesse Westbrook, Wall Street Rules May Fall Short of
Glass-Steagall, Bus. WK., May 26, 2010, http://www.businessweek.com/news/
2010-05-26/wall-street-rules-may-fall-short-of-glass-steagall-update 1 -.html.
177 See Bradley Keoun, Michael J. Moore & Jesse Westbrook, Citi's Prince Says
No One Saw CDO Losses Coming, BLOOMBERG, April 8, 2010,
http://www.bloomberg.com/ news/2010-04-08/citi-s-prince-says-no-one-saw-cdo-
losses-coming.html.
178 The government also agreed to share losses on a portfolio of approximately
$301 billion of Citigroup assets. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Written
Testimony of Assistant Secretary Allison before the Congressional Oversight Panel
(March 4, 2010), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/tg573.htm.
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additional capital. As a result, the government obtained a 33.6% common
stock interest. 179 In December 2009, Citigroup repurchased the balance of
the preferred shares owned by the government in order to exit from the
"exceptional assistance" program. 80 The government wants to conclude its
equity investment in 2010 and has begun to sell off its common stock,
subject to market conditions.181  Currently it has reduced its ownership
position to approximately eighteen percent of the common stock.
In contrast to the trust arrangement for the AIG shares, Treasury owns
the Citigroup securities directly. It has full discretion to vote the shares for
the election or removal of directors, approval of major transactions and
share issuances, and amendments to the certificate of incorporation and
bylaws. On all other matters, it agrees to vote in the same proportion as the
other shares.182
In contrast to the other bailouts, the government did not require the
removal of the CEO, probably because Charles Prince, the CEO who
famously stated in summer 2007 that the bank "was still dancing,"' 83 had
already resigned in November 2007 because of Citigroup's losses.184 While
there were frequent reports that the government would require the
resignation of Mr. Prince's successor, Vikram Pandit, in connection with
the July 2009 transaction, he remains CEO as of mid-2010. 85
There has been considerable turnover on the Citigroup board since the
government bailout, including the retirements of two directors associated
with the Prince era: Robert Rubin, who served as Chairman,186 and Sir Win
Bischoff, who served as acting CEO, after Mr. Prince's resignation.' The
extent to which these resignations were driven by the government is
impossible to know, but according to published reports, the government put
1' OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF
PROGRAM, QUARTERLY REPORT To CONGRESS at 68 (Oct. 21, 2009); see also
Citigroup, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at pt.3.02 (June 10, 2009).
180 SIGTARP, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS Jan. 2010, supra note 62, at 74.
181 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, supra note 13.
182 Citigroup, Inc., supra note 179.
183 See Michiyo Nakamoto & David Wighton, Citigroup ChiefStays Bullish on
Buy-Outs, FIN. TIMES, July 10, 2007, at 1.
184 In the Citigroup press release, Mr. Prince stated, "it is my judgment that given
the size of the recent losses in our mortgage-backed securities business, the only
honorable course for me to take as Chief Executive Officer is to step down." Press
Release, Citigroup, Inc., Robert E. Rubin to serve as chairman of the Board of Citi;
(Nov. 4, 2007), available at http://www.businesswire.com/portal/site/google/index.
jsp?ndmViewld-news view&newsld=20071104005057&newsLang-en.
185 See Eric Dash, Citi is Urged to Replace its Chairman, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12,
2009, at BI (reporting that Mr. Pankit has Timothy Geithner's support).
186 Citigroup, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Jan. 9, 2009).
187 Id.; see also Dash, supra note 185.
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considerable pressure on Citigroup to shake up its board of directors, to
signify a fresh start.188 Since the government bailout, the board of directors
has nominated, and the shareholders elected, eight new independent
directors.189 The personal and professional characteristics of this cohort are
very similar to those of the AIG directors: seven are men; the median age is
63; four are retired CEOs, two are current CEOs or senior management, one
is an academic, and one is the former President of Mexico.190 The median
number of other boards on which they serve is two.
In addition to its voting power, Treasury exercises oversight through its
monitoring of Citigroup's financial condition. Thus, Citigroup agreed to
provide Treasury with access to corporate books and financial and
accounting records until government ownership drops below a specified
percentage. 191 Treasury monitors Citigroup's liquidity, capital, profits and
losses, loss reserves and credit ratings, and hired an outside asset
management firm to monitor its investment.192 Finally, the government
asserts considerable influence over the company in its multiple roles as
regulator of the bank and other financial services firms that comprise
Citigroup; the press has frequently reported on the conflicting messages and
resulting confusion within the company resulting from the multiple federal
regulators.193
If we compare the Continental Illinois/AIG guiding principles, the
significant difference is that, as of July 2009, Treasury directly owns voting
shares. This was, as I discuss next, approximately the same time that
Treasury acquired its voting shares in the automakers and suggests that by
this time it had become more comfortable with its role as shareholder.
While the Citigroup CEO was not replaced, the principles otherwise remain
the same: replace some of the directors and assert a hands-off policy on
operational matters while exercising considerable control behind the scenes.
D. GM and Chrysler
GM and Chrysler are both icons of American industry whose continued
existence was in jeopardy because of decades of poor business decisions
and the slump in consumer spending occasioned by the financial crisis.19 4
188 Deborah Solomon & David Enrich, U.S. to Take Big Citi Stake and Overhaul
the Board, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 2009, at C1.
189 Citigroup, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 22 (Mar. 12,
2010).
190 Id
19' Citigroup, Inc., supra note 179, at Item 3.02.
192 GAO, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ROLE AS SHAREHOLDER, supra note 91, at 16.
193 See Langley & Enrich, supra note 21.
194 Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, Remarks by the
President on General Motors Restructuring (June 1, 2009), available at
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In December 2008, the administration set up the Automotive Industry
Financing Program under TARP,'95 and the Obama administration
established an automotive task force to force the companies to make
difficult decisions. 196 After twice submitting restructuring plans to the
government, the automakers went through a rapid bankruptcy process under
government pressure and assurances of government support. As the press
frequently noted, Chrysler was the first major U.S. automaker to file for
bankruptcy since 1933.197 In June 2009, Chrysler emerged from
bankruptcy, with Treasury owning 9.85% equity,198 and entered an alliance
with the Italian automaker Fiat. In July 2009, GM emerged from
bankruptcy, with Treasury owning 60.8% equity and $2.1 billion in
preferred shares.' 99 Unlike AIG and Citigroup, whose bailouts were driven
by fears of the impact on the financial markets, the government bailed out
GM and Chrysler because of the importance of the automobile industry as
an employer, particularly in the industrial Midwest, an area hard hit by the
financial crisis. 20 0 Indeed, the government conditioned its financing on
commitments from both companies to produce a portion of their vehicles in
the U.S. 20 1 Government assistance was also conditioned on the companies'
best efforts to reduce total compensation paid to U.S. employees to levels
comparable with total compensation paid by Honda, Nissan or Toyota at
their U.S. facilities.2 02
Treasury holds its common shares in the automakers directly and in
each case has entered a shareholders agreement with the other shareholders.
Prior to the GM IPO (which may occur in the latter part of 2010)203
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-
General-Motors-Restructuring/.
195 U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TROUBLE ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM:
CONTINUED STEWARDSHIP NEEDED AS TREASURY DEVELOPS STRATEGIES FOR
MONITORING AND DIVESTING FINANCIAL INTERESTS IN CHRYSLER AND GM, GAO-
10-151, at 1 (Nov. 2009) [hereinafter GAO, CONTINUED STEWARDSHIP], available
at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dl0151.pdf.
196 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Ron Bloom, Senior Advisor at
the U.S. Treasury Dep't Statement before the Cong. Oversight Panel Regarding
Treasury's Automotive Industry Financing Program (AIFP) (July 27, 2009),
available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/tg236.htm [hereinafter Press
Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury].
19 Jim Rutenberg & Bill Vlasic, Chrysler Files to Seek Bankruptcy Protection,
N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2009, at Al.
198 GAO, CONTINUED STEWARDSHIP, supra note 195, at 2.
199 Id.
200 Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, supra note 194.
201 GAO, CONTINUED STEWARDSHIP, supra note 195, at 15.
202 Id. at 12.
203 Soyoung Kim & Philipp Halstrick, GMIPO Filing, in Auto Loan Talks:
Sources, REUTERS, June 23, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE65
M5L220100624.
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Treasury can vote its shares as it determines.2 04  Thereafter, the
government's voting policy with respect to its GM and Chrysler shares is
essentially the same: it can vote its shares for (1) director removal, (2)
director election as agreed, (3) change of control transactions, (4)
amendments to the certificate of incorporation and bylaws that would affect
voting rights, and (5) other matters, solely to the extent its vote is required
and in the same proportion as the public shareholders.2 05
Finally, so long as Treasury owns at least ten percent of common stock,
GM must provide all financial statements, budgets, reports, liquidity
statements, and other information pursuant to the credit agreement, as well
as a monthly report, the format and content of which Treasury has the right
to specify. 206
The CEOs of both companies announced their resignations during the
negotiations with the administration over the restructurings. It was widely
reported in the press that the administration forced out G. Richard
Wagoner, Jr., GM's CEO, as a condition of the restructuring,207 while
Robert Nardelli, the Chrysler CEO, stated he made the decision
voluntarily.208  At GM, there were subsequent changes at the top. In
December 2009, the GM board, in a surprise move, asked Frederick "Fritz"
Henderson, Mr. Wagoner's successor, to resign, reportedly because as a
twenty-five year GM employee, he was not "enough of a change agent;"
Treasury stated it was not involved in the decision. 2 09 Edward Whitacre
succeeded Mr. Henderson, first as interim CEO, then as permanent CEO in
January 2010.210 The administration had selected Mr. Whitacre, a former
AT&T CEO, to be Chairman of the GM board when GM emerged from
bankruptcy.2 11
204 General Motors, Co., Stockholders Agreement (Form 8-K) (July 16, 2009).
205 Id.; see GAO, THE U.S. GOvERNMENT ROLE AS SHAREHOLDER, supra note 91,
at 13.
206 General Motors Co., supra note 204, at art. IV § 5.4; GAO, THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT ROLE AS SHAREHOLDER, supra note 91, at 14.
207 Neil King, Jr. & John D. Stoll, Government Forces Out Wagoner at GM, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 30, 2009, at Al.
208 David Welch & David Kiley, Chrysler Files for Bankruptcy, Bus. WK., Apr. 30,
2009, http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/apr2009/db2009043
0 841531.htm.2(9 Bill Vlasic, G.M Asks Its Chief to Resign, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2009, at Bi.
210 General Motors, Co., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Dec. 7, 2009). Mr. Henderson
stepped down after increased pressure from the Board of Directors. See John D.
Stoll & Kate Linebaugh, GM's Chairman Seizes the Wheel, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1,
2009 at Al.
211 Bill Vlasic, G.M Chairman Vows to Defend Market Share, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4,
2009, at B 1.
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Pursuant to the GM Shareholders Agreement, Treasury can designate
ten of the thirteen directors.212 In the case of the Chrysler board, Treasury
213can designate four of the nine directors. The profile of these fourteen
directors appointed by Treasury again fits the profile of the typical
independent director. Eleven of the fourteen directors are men; the median
age is 60. Five are current CEOs or senior management, seven are retired
CEOs or senior management, two are academics (one of whom is
Chancellor of a major state university system). The median number of
other boards is between one and two.2 14
While the heavy hand of the government was visible in forcing the
companies into bankruptcy, both the President and Treasury reiterated the
"reluctant shareholder" policy. President Obama emphasized that the
financial crisis "[has] put our government in the unwelcome position of
owning large stakes in private companies for the simple and compelling
reason that their survival and the success of our overall economy depend on
it."215 The government stated that it would seek to exit as soon as
practicable,2 16 planned to manage its interest in a hands-off manner217 and
did not plan to manage its interests to achieve social policy goals.2 18
Notwithstanding the administration's characterization of itself as a passive
shareholder, the GM and Chrysler bailouts show that it will negotiate for
conditions driven by concerns other than corporate profitability.
Conditioning the financing on the automakers' commitment to produce a
212 The GM CEO is one of the directors, one is designated by UAW Retiree
Medical Benefits Trust, and one is designated by Canada Holdings. At least two-
thirds of all directors must be independent under NYSE rules. General Motors Co.,
sura note 204.
2 Fiat appoints three, the Canadian government appoints one, and the UAW
Retiree Medical Benefits Trust appoints one. Michael. J. de la Merced & Micheline
Maynard, Fiat Takes over Chrysler after 42-Day Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, June 11,
2009, at B4.
214 See Board ofDirectors, GENERAL MOTORS CO. (Aug. 10, 2010),
http://www.gm.com/corporate/about/board.jsp (containing information on GM
Board of Directors); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Treasury
Department Statement on Chrysler's Board of Director Appointments (July 5,
2009) (listing the appointments that the Treasury made to the Chrysler Board of
Directors), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tgl97.htm; see also
Board ofDirectors, CHRYSLER GROUP LLC, http://www.media.chrysler.comlbios.
do;jsessionid=59EA2FO95383CD9943E4E9CO96DI776A? (last visited Aug. 10,
2010 (information on the Board of Directors currently at Chrysler).
215 Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, supra note 194.
216 Treasury agreed to use its best efforts to cause an IPO within one year. See
General Motors Co., supra note 204.
217 Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, supra note 194
(stating that "what we are not doing-what I have no interest in doing-is running
GM").
218 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, supra note 196.
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portion of their vehicles in the United States was driven by the desire to
save jobs for U.S. workers. 2 19  This same tension between jobs and
profitability resurfaced in the controversy over the closings of dealerships.
The controversy over the closing of auto dealerships provides the best
example of a clash between business policy and politics. The business
strategy of both automakers required reducing the number of dealerships to
become leaner and more cost-effective. 22 0 Auto dealerships, however, have
political clout, and it was much in evidence. 22 1 Although there were no
reports that the administration interfered in these decisions, individual
Congressional representatives expressed indignation at the -perceived
unfairness. 222 Senator Jay Rockefeller (D-W.V.) expressed a typical
sentiment: "Let me be very clear-I don't believe that companies should be
allowed to take taxpayer funds for a bailout and then leave local dealers and
their customers to fend for themselves with no real notice and no real help.
It's just plain wrong." 2 23  Indeed, as in the case of the Congressional
hearing on the AIG Trustees,224 many members of Congress showed a
misunderstanding of the shareholder's role.. Thus, Senator Mark Warner
(D-Va.) acknowledged the danger of "micro-managing" the companies but
concluded that as government owners "we've got the right and
responsibility to ask these questions." 225 In the end, Congress did intervene
and gave terminated dealers a right to arbitration. 2 26 Approximately 1100
GM dealers appealed termination decisions; GM recently announced it
219 OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF
PROGRAM, FACTORS AFFECTING THE DECISIONS OF GENERAL MOTORS AND.
CHRYSLER TO REDUCE THEIR DEALERSHIP NETWoRKS 3 (JULY 19, 2010), available
at http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/audit/201 0/Factors%2OAffecting%20the%20
Decisions%200f/o20General%20Motors%20and%20Chrysler%20to%20Reduce%
20Their/o20Dealership%20Networks%207 19 2010.pdf.
220 GM announced that it planned to reduce the number of GM dealers in the U.S.
from 6000 to approximately 3600. Press Release, General Motors, Co., The New
General Motors Launches Today (July 10, 2009), available at
http://www.buicknaias.com/content/medialus/en/news/newsdetail.brandgm.html/
content/Pages/news/us/en/2009/Jul/07 10_NewGMLaunches. The bankruptcy
judge overseeing the Chrysler bankruptcy allowed it to terminate about twenty-five
percent of its dealer franchises immediately: Judge Says Chrysler Has Good Case
for Franchise Cuts, USA TODAY, June 5, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/money/
autos/2009-06-04-chrysler-court N.htm.
221 Carl Hulse & Bernie Becker, Auto Dealers at Risk Turn to Washington, N.Y.
TIMES, June 12, 2009, at Bl.
222 id.
223 Peter Whoriskey & Kendra Marr, Senators Blast Automakers Over Dealer
Closings, WASH. POST, June 4, 2009, at A15.
224 See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
225 See Whoriskey & Marr, supra note 223.
226 Dana Hedgpeth, GM to Reinstate 600 Dealerships Slated to Close, WASH. POST,
Mar. 6,2010, at A12.
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would reinstate about 600 of them. 22 7 SIGTARP examined the process
used to terminate auto dealerships and was sharply critical of the
government's role in these decisions, particularly its failure to take greater
account of job losses at the terminated dealerships.22 8
While the rationale for the bailouts was different in the case of the
automakers than it was for the financial services firms, otherwise the
Continental Illinois/AIG/Citigroup principles were followed: removal of the
CEOs, changes in the composition of the board of directors, assertion of a
"hands-off" policy. While there is less evidence of Treasury's exercising
behind-the-scenes control in the case of the automakers, Congress in fact
directly interfered with the companies' business strategy through its
intervention in the dealership closings. 2 29
E. Ally (f/k/a GMA C)
Ally was established in 1919 as a GM subsidiary to provide automotive
financing.230 Over time it expanded into other areas, including real estate
finance, and in 2006 GM sold the company to Cerberus.2 3' The company
was hard hit by the collapse of both the housing and the automobile
markets. In December 2008, the Federal Reserve approved its application
to create a bank,232 and the government provided infusions of capital into
the company, for a total of $16.3 billion.2 33 As a result of the third
investment in December 2009, the government's equity interest was
227 id.
228 OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF
PROGRAM, supra note 219, at summary of report (stating that "perhaps it is
inevitable that public ownership of private companies will have the effect of
blurring the Government's appropriate role"). Treasury stated that it strongly
disagreed with the report. Id. at app.D.
229 As additional evidence of Congressional meddling: a spokesperson for Rep.
Darrell Issa objected to GM's gift of a free sports car to a Detroit Tigers baseball
player who was robbed of a perfect game by an umpire's bad call, stating that
"[u]ntil G.M. has repaid the taxpayers in full for the money they have borrowed,
every action that G.M. takes should advance them in that direction." Nick Bunkley,
Luxury Car As a Gift Stuns a Few, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2010, at Bl.
230GMC Gets New Name: Ally Financial, 1853 CHAIRMAN (May 7, 2010),
http://www.1853chairman.com/2010/05/09/gmac-gets-new-name-ally-fmancial/.
231 Press Release, Cerberus Capital Mgmt., LP, GM Reaches Agreement to Sell
Controlling Stake in GMAC (Apr. 3, 2006), available at
http://www.cerberuscapital.com/newspress release_040306.html.
232 GMAC, LLC, Current Report (Form 8-K) (Dec. 24, 2008).
233 Hibah Yousuf, GMAC Receives 3rd Round ofBailout Funds, CNNMONEY, Dec.
30, 2009, http://money.cnn.com/2009/12/30/news/companies/gmac-bailout/
index.htm.
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increased to fifty-six percent (from the previous thirty-five percent),234 and
Treasury has the right to appoint four (up from previous two) of nine
directors.2 3 5 The governance agreement provides that in connection with
any IPO the parties will "revisit the terms of the agreement and work
together in good faith to make such modifications as may be reasonably
necessary to facilitate such public offering... ."236
While the board removed its CEO Alvaro de Molina in November 2009
because of the company's failure to raise additional funds required by the
government stress tests, the administration stated that it played no part in
that decision.237
To date the government has appointed only three directors of the four
directors it is entitled to name. Again they fit the pattern: two are men, and
the median age is sixty-one. One is currently a CEO, one is an investment
banker, and one is a principal in a private equity firm.238
We do not know much about the government's involvement in Ally;
Treasury's failure to appoint the full number of directors it is authorized to
name suggests that its involvement is minimal. The Congressional
Oversight Panel was critical of the government's bailout of the company,
since Ally did not present systemic risk and it was not "too big to fail."2 39 It
also noted that Treasury had yet to require a business -plan from its
management.2 40 Perhaps the message from Ally is that the administration
has become too comfortable with bailouts and too willing to expend
government funds on private business.
IV. A MODEST PROPOSAL
Despite assertions from Congressional members that the era of federal
bailouts is over, the reality is that there will be future financial crises and
the government will bail out businesses whose failure presents systemic risk
to the financial markets. Many of the government's actions since fall 2008
234 SIGTARP, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS Jan. 2010, supra note 62, at 46.
235 See Michael J. de la Merced & Eric Dash, Lending Giant GMAC Asks for More
US. Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2009, at BI; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep't of
the Treasury, Treasury Names Appointee to Ally Board of Directors (May 26,
2010) (listing the two newest appointees, totaling the number of government
appointments to four),. available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/
tg720.htm.6 GMAC, LLC, Current Report (Form 8-K) (May 21, 2009).
237 Dan Fitzpatrick & David Enrich, GMAC Chief Ousted by Board, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 17, 2009, at Al.
238 Ally Financial, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Mar. 3, 2010).239 CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, MARCH OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE UNIQUE
TREATMENT OF GMAC UNDER TARP, 121 (Mar. 10, 2010).
240 Id. at 46.
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have been ad hoc decisions made in extremely pressured situations. As the
bailouts wind-down, policymakers should focus on the normative
questions: when is it appropriate for the government to intervene, what
form should the intervention take, and (the specific issue that is the focus of
this paper) how should the government act when it becomes a shareholder
in private business.
As I have shown in Part III, from Continental Illinois through Ally, the
government developed a set of principles about how it will act as a
shareholder: removal of the CEO, substantial changes on the board of
directors, and expression of a hands-off policy as shareholder with behind-
the-scenes influence in other capacities. In essence, the government has
adopted the prevailing model of corporate governance, with its emphasis on
independent directors and strong internal controls. Moreover, the directors
that have been elected since the government's tenure generally fit the
profile for independent directors of public corporations: they are
predominately white males who are retired CEOs or senior management,
presumably chosen because of their general business experience and
gravitas. Consistent with this model, the role of the government as
shareholder has been passive; the AIG Trustees have resisted efforts to
become activist shareholders, and the government consistently states that it
is a "reluctant shareholder."
Of course there has been government involvement, and indeed the
government would be acting recklessly if it did not act to protect the
billions of dollars of government funds at risk. Accordingly, the
government has intervened behind the scenes principally in its roles as
creditor, regulator and politician. The government has intervened in a less
systematic and more confrontational manner that has led to
misunderstandings, as for example: the TARP Special Master making
decisions on executive compensation that made no business sense to the
AIG Chairman; 241 Citigroup being confused about what the various federal
regulators expected from it; 24 2 and Congress placing restrictions on the
ability of the automakers to cancel dealerships and downsize.243
Moreover, members of the public understandably want greater
transparency in order to assess for themselves how these uneasy alliances
between government and business are working out. Accordingly,
Treasury's reluctance to disclose the identities of the AIG counterparties in
the company's SEC filings, whatever the motivation, unfortunately fueled
public distrust. 244 A review of the AIG and Citigroup SEC filings reveals
very little concrete information about the nature and extent of government
241 See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
242 See Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, supra note 194.
243 See supra notes 223-28 and accompanying text.
244 See supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
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involvement. The 2010 AIG proxy statement does little more than identify
as a risk factor the government's stock ownership and warn that the
government's interest may be different from other shareholders. 24 5
Similarly, the Citigroup proxy statement and Annual Report do not provide
information on the effect of government involvement, except with respect
to executive compensation decisions. Citigroup only identifies a risk factor
the effect the sale of the government shares may have on the stock price.24
While it may seem silly to get upset that GM gave a car to a Detroit
baseball player,24 7 the adverse public reaction to this gift may reflect a
frustration about lack of information.
Perhaps it is time to consider another approach. My modest proposal
accepts that the director primacy model is the prevalent corporate
governance theory. Working with that model, I make three suggestions: (1)
When Treasury is a substantial shareholder, it should work with corporate
management regularly to provide the general public with clear specific
statements about government intervention and its effect on the corporation.
(2) When Treasury is a substantial shareholder in a public corporation, it
should use its power to nominate and run its own nominees for the board of
directors, who would serve on the board as representatives of Treasury in
order to represent the interests of the U.S. taxpayer. (3) When Treasury, as
a shareholder in either a public or private corporation, has the power to
elect or appoint directors, it should select at least some high-level Treasury
officials to those directorships. Unlike directors who come from the
business sector, they will be able to present the government's perspectives
and concerns to management and the other members of the board.
As to the first proposal: the classic corporate governance model
provides shareholders with little information apart from SEC filings and
what management may voluntarily disclose. 24 8  Limited access to
information is consistent with the passive role of shareholders. In a
corporation in which the government has taken a substantial equity interest,
however, members of the general public have reason for concern, for this is
an extraordinary situation in which all U.S. taxpayers have a sizable stake.
It is also understandable that, given the unusual situation, the public would
be confused or mistrustful of government intervention. Under these
circumstances, the government should work with management to provide
maximum transparency, consistent with protecting the corporation's
legitimate needs for confidentiality.
The principal objection to this proposal is that it would put undue
burdens on management and government at a time when decisions and
245 See AIG: Where is the Taxpayer's Money Going?, supra note 135.
246 CITIGROUP, supra note 7, at 56; Citigroup, Inc., supra note 189, at 48.
247 See GMAC Gets New Name: Ally Financial, supra note 230.
248 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 50.
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judgments affecting the company's continued viability would likely have to
be made in a compressed time frame. A related concern is the increased
risks of federal securities fraud liability for intentional false disclosures
relating to material information. These objections are consistently made
whenever expanded disclosure duties are advocated. In order to establish
liability for securities fraud disclosure violations, however, plaintiffs must
establish scienter, which requires proof of intentional misconduct or
reckless conduct, and federal courts maintain high standards for plaintiffs to
meet the burdens of pleading and proof. It is unlikely that this provision
would increase directors' potential liability. Another objection is that it
would put the corporation at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis
companies that did not need bailing out. While this may be true, it is a cost
of the bailout and should not override the public's need to know.
As to the second and third proposals: the participation in the corporate
boardroom of directors who are identified as government representatives
could do much to alleviate the tensions between the business and the
government. The government directors would be members of the body
charged with the responsibility of acting in the best interests of the
shareholders and would participate in the important business decisions. As
members of the board of directors, the government representatives would
be in the best position to explain the government's concerns and to listen to
the management's concerns. A greater understanding on the part of all
directors could promote a more informed balancing of competing interests.
In addition, because the directors would be better informed about the
business, they would be better able to monitor the government's
investment. In this way, perhaps business and government objectives could
both be advanced in a more sustained, policy-oriented, less confrontational
manner.
A principal objection to my proposal is that the government
representatives, as members of the board of directors, would owe fiduciary
duties to the corporation that could conflict with their obligations to the
U.S. government. However, as discussed earlier, 24 9 boards have broad
discretion to take into account social and policy considerations in exercising
their business judgment; operating a business in a manner reasonably
designed to pay off government debt would surely pass muster. Moreover,
so long as directors act in good faith and without gross negligence, their
actions will be protected by the business judgment rule. Finally, the
government, as a controlling shareholder, may already owe a fiduciary duty
to the minority shareholders in at least some circumstances.250
Another objection is that the U.S. corporate model views with disfavor
''special interest" directors because the board of directors is supposed to act
249 See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
250 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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as a collective decision-maker and arrive at business decisions that reflect
the consensus. That is an ideal, however, that may not conform with actual
practice. Use of a controlling shareholder's voting power to place its
representatives on a board, moreover, is accepted practice, and some boards
do include directors that represent a constituency, as when preferred shares
get voting rights because of unpaid dividends or the certificate of
incorporation allows for cumulative voting.
Finally, another objection is that this is yet another step closer to
"nationalizing private business" or even "socialism." Because of the U.S.
aversion to these concepts, this objection may well be a conversation
stopper, in which case we will muddle along, hope that the government can
extricate itself from these companies and pray that this will never happen
again. That would be unfortunate.
